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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
SIMONE LUCIA KENT,

Case No. 960606-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
Appellant Simone Kent ("Kent") maintains that in the context
of this case, the Computer Crimes statute and those statutes
proscribing Forgery, Insurance Fraud, and Communications Fraud
are written so that the exact same conduct is subject to
different penalties depending upon which offense the prosecutor
chooses to charge. Thus, Kent is entitled to have her case
proceed under the statute carrying the less severe penalty. State
v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146, 148 (Utah 1969).
In response, the state disregards whether the conduct is
subject to different penalties, and advocates for a stringent
inquiry considering only whether the statutes contain "wholly
duplicative" elements. (State's Brief ("S.B.") at 6-15.) Such a
rigid inquiry has not been sanctioned by the Utah Supreme Court.
In addition, the state's analysis under the stringent inquiry is incorrect. The state strains to distinguish the Computer
Crimes statute from the other provisions. (S.B. at 6-15.) It incorrectly claims a clarifying amendment to the Forgery statute is
inapplicable here; the Insurance Fraud statute contains a falserepresentation element that is not in the Computer Crimes
statute; and the Communications Fraud statute contains a communi-

cation element that is not necessary in proving a violation of
the Computer Crimes statute.

Finally, the state concludes that

the conduct alleged is not subject to differing penalties.

The

state's arguments are unpersuasive, as set forth below.
ARGUMENT
SINCE THE CONDUCT ALLEGED HERE MAY BE CHARGED UNDER THE
COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE OR THE OTHER FRAUD PROVISIONS, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ORDER THE STATE TO PROCEED
UNDER THE STATUTE CARRYING THE LESS SEVERE PENALTY.
The state applies a rigid analysis to the issue raised in
this case: "The test for determining whether two statutes
proscribe the same conduct is whether the 'two statutes are
wholly duplicative as to the elements of the crime.' [State v.
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985).]"

(S.B. at 7.)

Such a

strict inquiry fails to take into consideration the
constitutional doctrines implicated in the Shondel rule:
The well-established rule is that a statute creating a crime
should be sufficiently certain that persons of ordinary
intelligence who desire to obey the law may know how to
conduct themselves in conformity with it. A fair and
logical concomitant of that rule is that such a penal
statute should be similarly clear, specific and
understandable as to the penalty imposed for its violation.
Related to the doctrine just stated is the rule that

where there is doubt or uncertainty
as to which of two
punishments is applicable
to an offense an accused is
entitled
to the benefit of the
lesser.
Id. at 148 (emphasis added) .
Shondel and its Utah Supreme Court progeny are grounded in
the proposition that where the same facts

may be used in

prosecutions under two completely integrated statutes, e.g. a
misdemeanor statute and a felony statute, the state must proceed
2

under the misdemeanor statute. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. The equal
protection doctrine supports the rule.
Equal protection of the law guarantees like treatment of all
those who are similarly situated. Accordingly, the criminal
laws must be written so that there are significant
differences between offenses and so that the exact
same

conduct is not subject
which of two statutory

to different
penalties
sections a prosecutor

depending uvon
chooses to

charge. To allow that would be to allow a form of
arbitrariness that is foreign to our system of law. The
Legislature may make automobile homicide which is committed
recklessly either a misdemeanor or a felony, but it cannot
make the crime both a felony and a misdemeanor, leaving the
choice to the prosecutor as to whether he charges a felony
or a misdemeanor.
Because a "reckless" defendant could, for the same
behavior, be charged under either statute, the statutes give
a prosecutor impermissible discretion to choose a
defendant's penalty based upon which statute the prosecutor
chooses to charge under.
Id. (emphasis added); State v. Loveless, 581 P.2d 575, 576 (Utah
1978) ("when there are two statutes as here which prohibit the
same conduct but impose different penalties, [defendant] is
entitled to the lesser penalty"); State v. Fair, 456 P.2d 168
(Utah 1969) (an act subject to two legislative fiats, one of
which would penalize the accused as a misdemeanant and the other
as a felon, gives the accused the benefit of being accountable
only for the lesser of the two penalties).
Utah Supreme Court precedent does not support limiting the
query to the state's rigid "wholly duplicative" analysis. In
Loveless, the defendant was convicted of a first degree felony,
aggravated sexual assault, which simply proscribed having sex
with a person under 14 years of age. On appeal defendant argued
the state should have been required to proceed under the rape
3

statute, which made it a second degree felony to have sexual
intercourse with a female, "not [defendant's] wife, without her
consent." Loveless, 581 P.2d at 576. The Utah Supreme Court
agreed with defendant, reversing the case. Id. at 577. The
"wholly duplicative" analysis did not apply in the rigid fashion
advanced by the state here. The court determined where conduct
was proscribed by two statutes, defendant was entitled to have
the state proceed under the statute carrying the lesser penalty.
After Loveless came Bryan.

There defendant was accused of

driving at approximately 50 miles per hour while intoxicated
through a red light and into the victims' automobile, causing
their deaths.

Bryan, 709 P.2d at 259.

defendant with felony manslaughter.

The state charged

Defendant argued that the

charge should be reduced to automobile homicide, or in the
alternative to misdemeanor negligent homicide. The Utah Supreme
Court reiterated that the reduction rule was based on the concept
that defendant would be denied equal protection of the laws "'if
the

same

identical

facts

may be used in prosecutions under two

completely integrated statutes, one a misdemeanor and the other a
felony.'"

Id. at 261 (quoting. State v. Twitchell, 333 P. 2d

1075, 1077 (Utah 1959) (emphasis in original)).
The Utah Supreme Court then recognized that manslaughter "is
committed when one ' [r]ecklessly

causes

the

death

of another,'"

and negligent homicide occurs "[w]hen the death of any person
ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received
by the driving of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety
4

of others." Id. at 263. Notwithstanding any perceived difference
in the statutes, the Utah Supreme Court found the provisions were
"the same" requiring the state to proceed under the statute
carrying the less severe penalty. Id. "[W]e cannot disregard our
responsibility to assure the rational and evenhanded application
of the criminal laws." Id.
By advocating a rigid "wholly duplicative" analysis, the
state is elevating an incidental statement in Bryan, 709 P.2d at
263 ("We held in [Shondel] that if two statutes are wholly
duplicative as to the elements of the crime, the law does not
permit a prosecutor to exercise the wholly unfettered authority
to decide whether the crime should be charged as a misdemeanor or
a felony"), over constitutional considerations and the
responsibility of the court to assure rational and evenhanded
application of criminal laws.
After Brvanf the Utah Supreme Court continued to apply the
analysis based in constitutional doctrines without reliance or
emphasis on the "wholly duplicative" language.
The analytical framework for evaluating the defendants'
claim is set out in [Bryan],
[T]he criminal laws must be written so that there are
significant differences between offenses and so that
the exact same conduct is not subject to different
penalties depending on which of two statutory sections
a prosecutor chooses to charge. To allow that would be
to allow a form of arbitrariness that is foreign to our
system of law.
Thus, in the present case, the question is whether the two
statutes at issue proscribe exactly the same conduct, i.e.
do they contain the same elements?
State v. Gomez, 722 P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986); State v. Bishop,
753 P.2d 439, 481 (Utah 1988) (statutes do not "overlap"); but
5

see. State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App. 1991) (representing that subsequent

lf

cases^

"indicate" that in order for

Shondel to apply, statutes must by "wholly duplicative as to the
elements of the crime," then citing only to Bryan); State v.
Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989) (asserting that application of Shondel is limited to situations where elements of
statutes are "wholly duplicative").1
In this case the relevant query is whether two separate
statutes apply to the same facts. Kent maintains that the conduct
alleged in this case is subject to different penalties depending
upon which offense the prosecutor chooses to charge, as set forth
in Appellant's Brief. The result is the same under the state's
analysis.
A. THE COMPUTER CRIMES STATUTE AND OTHER FRAUD-BASED
STATUTES SHARE ELEMENTS.
The state asserts the Computer Crimes statute, Utah Code
Ann. § 76-6-703(3) (Supp. 1996), 2 requires proof of the
following elements:
1) [A] person must use or knowingly allow another person to
use a computer or computer system 2) to devise or execute an
artifice or scheme 3) to defraud or obtain money, services,
property, or something of value, 4) by false pretenses,
promises, or representations.
(S.B. at 8-9.)

It also asserts the statute "does not proscribe

1

Kent does not dispute that the rule articulated in Shondel
applies when the elements of two separate statutes are wholly
duplicative. See Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263. However, Shondel is not
limited in application to that context.
2

The state relies on an April 1995 version of the statute. In
May 1995, amendments that are irrelevant here went into effect.
6

the same conduct as the forgery, insurance fraud, and the communications fraud statutes." (S.B. at 4.) Kent addresses the
state's arguments with respect to each statute, as set forth
below.
1.

The Forgery and Computer Crimes Statutes.

According to the state, "the elements of forgery relevant to
this case are that one must 1) with intent to defraud 2) [make,
complete, execute, or] utter a writing 3) so that [it] purports
to be that of another or purports to have been executed at a time
or place in numbered sequence other than was in fact the case."
(S.B. at 9 (citing Section § 76-6-501 (1) (b) (1995)).) Shondel
applies since the conduct alleged here is subject to penalty
under both the Computer Crimes statute and the Forgery statute.
Allegedly, Kent with intent to defraud executed, completed, or
made a computer transmission so that it purported to be a claim
of another, Cathleen Gullett, for payment. (R. 1-3; 47-48.)
The state argues that the Forgery statute is inapplicable
here on the basis that it requires proof that defendant made,
completed, executed or uttered a "writing."3

According to the

state, a "writing" is not a computer alteration, entry or

3

The first Forgery element is "to defraud," as set forth in
element 3 of the Computer Crimes Statute. The statutes share that
element. In addition, the statutes both proscribe the making of
false representations.
7

transmission.

Yet, under the Forgery statute, the legislature

has defined "writing" as such. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2)
(Supp. 1996). The state regards the definition inapplicable.
It asserts that when Kent was charged in November 1995 with
the Computer Crimes offense, the term "writing" was defined to
"include [] printing or any other method of recording information,
checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks,
money, and any other symbols of value, right privilege, or
identification."

(S.B. at 9 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-

501(2) (1995)).)

In 1996 the legislature amended the definition

of "writing" to "include[] printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method" of recording information.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (Supp. 1996). The amendment simply
clarifies

the definition: A "writing" includes computer generated

information. Retroactive application of the amendment is
supported by the following cases.
In Camp v. Office of Recovery Services of Utah Dept. of
Social Services, 779 P.2d 242 (Utah App. 1989), plaintiff's
daughter was a passenger in a vehicle involved in an accident,
which caused the daughter's death. Before her death, the daughter
incurred $39,000 in medical expenses. Plaintiff filed for financial assistance to cover the expenses.

After plaintiff was ini-

tially denied assistance, she retained counsel, wrote a demand
letter to the insurance carrier for the driver of the vehicle,
settled with the insurance carrier and reapplied for the assistance. Plaintiff was found eligible for assistance and reimbursed
8

1 -:

--

r.-M

...::: :x

•-

J.

=

. ;::J „

.1 d ,

d I

,:1 'I .3

4 4 .

When the state learned of plaintiff's settlement with the
insurance carrier

* souaht reimbursement

The trial court found

- - ^avor ^:. i. ...aii^-ii -=.:..: :.:.:- . tate appealed.
+

According

Id. at 243 4 4 ,

c * he statute :. r: effect at the time of the matter

a

Derson seekir.n stace financial assistance was prohibj ted from
ix^ing a _ c . \ or commencing an action against a thiid party for
recovery of medical costs for _•.:: injury.
*"
to ^ i l c o L

" "^pri"d

ana new words were added

Li.ai a ^xouii oc^jvii^ dbsistance was prohibited from

filing a clair-. commencing an action or sr-:~.ling,
is,..
M

ne original act musr be compared

original act the legislature intended
:

' ry

YUc- amended d e f u ^ i L^L ^ L ,:eu Ldtioa^i.ve^y

"[biased on the rule ths

-

:

:- *

•.

medical costs

compromising,

remedy

. ^46

Utah Dep't of Social Services v. Higley, 81 G -.2d 43 6, 438
A:

-

:

-

merely intended Lu clarify trie statute .; ,,iciei t
claim resolution^
o aii

~- •:_ h~

:

_
^_, --- -

«— ^ ^—- f-^- -

* ' - ^ •*

> -i

encompass all

*_ : at 24f n I'

^ > ^ 1'V - ^- '^- —' _2.

reiterated that ne^ wci as added tr

J.

t^ - j -•- e \

t

~ statute merely serve to

clarify the statute. Such an amendment is not substantive,
ye i.

• ie

P. 2a at 43 8.

. _• -*

[::: 1 ii c a t : i oi l • :: f 11 le s t a11 11e

-

8 II 0

i-Viere amendments clar ify or amplify how the earlier

] iw should ha-'e be^r understood., they are remedial
di ^

Higley

in nature and

hat the 1 a\ i :i ::: es n Dt appl y
9

retroactively.
In this case, the amendment provides clarification. The
former version of the Forgery statute defining "writing"
contemplated "any" "method of recording" or storing information.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-501(2) (1995). The amendment merely makes
the implicit explicit by specifically articulating electronic
storage and transmission as a form of "writing."
Where an amendment merely adopts language in furtherance of
the apparent legislative intent, the amended definition is
retroactively applied. Since element 2 of the Forgery statute
proscribes use of a computer in making the false representations
or perpetrating the fraud, for purposes of this case, the Forgery
and Computer Crimes contain the same elements.
The state also asserts that forgery requires that the
writing "purport to be that of another" (S.B. at 9-10), and that
the Computer Crimes statute has no such requirement.

That is

incorrect. The Computer Crimes statute proscribes false
pretenses, promises and representations, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6703(3) (Supp. 1996), which is the equivalent of engaging in
conduct purporting to be that of another.

In addition, in this

case, Kent was charged with completing an electronic transmission
purporting to be a claim of another, "Cathleen Gullett," for
payment.
Since the conduct alleged in this action violates both the
Forgery and Computer Crimes statutes, and those statutes contain
the same elements in this context, the trial court erred in
10
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stated,

un Ndiuii j./, 1995/ FBi special Agent v%t bcepr. .. .\mttie
received information from Leslie Warner of th-- First Health
security department, ' Salt Lake City, Utah, that possible
computerized fraud had occurred in their insurance claim
system, and that two unauthorized checks for $3,500 and
• $7,500 had been sent from,, their office to a post office box
located in West Valley City, UT. in the name of Cathleen
Gullett. The defendant was identified as the operator of
the terminal from, which the unauthorized, checks had been
issued.
)

The state asserts that the i n s u r a n c e Fraud statute, is not
11

applicable here since it "target[s] different criminal conduct
[than the Computer Crimes statute]. The computer crimes statute
proscribes the use of a computer to defraud anyone else.

The

insurance fraud statute on the other hand aims to punish those
who file false claims with insurance companies pursuant to
insurance policies or contracts."

(S.B. at 13.)

Inasmuch as the Information in this case alleged defrauding
an insurance claim system and using a computer in the process,
this case presents a unique situation in that the state had the
choice of targeting one aspect of the offense over the other,
depending upon which offense the prosecutor chose to charge.
Leaving the prosecutor with the "choice" implicates equal
protection and due process concerns. Shondel 453 P.2d at 148;
Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263.
In one case, the prosecutor may choose to focus on the means
used to perpetrate the fraud against an insurance claims system,
and charge under the Computer Crimes statute, as in Kent's case.
The defendant is charged with a second degree felony. In an
identical case, the prosecutor may choose to focus on the victim,
and charge under the Insurance Fraud statute. The defendant is
charged with a third degree felony. The prosecutor's classification of the defendants is arbitrary and standardless, resulting
in disparate treatment. Shondel, Loveless, and Bryan prohibit
that form of classification.

See also State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d

991, 998 (Utah 1995) (leaving the choice to the prosecutor is
arbitrary and standardless under state constitution).
Since both statutes "specifically" target conduct alleged in
12

the Information filed against Kent,, leaving the p r o s e c u t o r w i t h
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A p e r s o n is guilty of communications fraud if he or she h a s
L.1J d e v i s e d a n y scheme or artifice [2] to defraud another or
to o b t a i n from another money, property or anything of value
[3] b y m e a n s of false o r fraudulent p r e t e n s e s ,
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s , promises ox material o m i s s i o n s , and * .v
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(S.B. at 14 (citing U t a h Code A n n . § 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 6 " "

>

4

T h e state also asserts that the Computer Cr 1 m e S S L a L u L . c va LJ c: ^D
not require proof that a false representation h a s b e e n m a d e in
support of a claim for payment pursuant to an insurance p o l i c y .

"Indeed,

a computer crime does not require

any representation

at

all*n
(S.B. at 13.) That assertion is inaccurate. T h e Computer
Crimes
statute
specifically
proscribes
the u s e of
false
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s in devising a scheme or artifice to o b t a i n money,
p r o p e r t y o r other thing of v a l u e .
U t a h Code A n n . § 76-6-703(3)
(Supp. 1 9 9 6 ) .
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state acknowledges that the Communications Fraud statute and
Computer Crimes statute share elements and the Communications
Fraud statute proscribes perpetrating the fraud via use of
computer.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(6); (S.B. at 13-14).

Notwithstanding the duplications in elements, the state
relies on the rigid "wholly duplicative" analysis to assert the
communications fraud statute "requires a direct or indirect
communication with a person for the purpose of executing or
concealing a scheme to defraud another. In contrast, the computer crimes statute does not require any communication. A person
can commit a computer crime without communicating anything to
anyone." (S.B. at 14.) The state's assertion is irrational.

Kent

allegedly used a computer system to execute and conceal the
scheme by directly or indirectly communicating the claim to
someone authorizing payment.

According to the state, a computer

is used to commit such a crime for the purpose of executing and
concealing the fraudulent scheme through the in/direct
communication. "Using a computer to steal or defraud is easy to
do and extremely difficult to detect." (S.B. at 24.) The computer
allegedly facilitates concealing the scheme through direct or
indirect communication.
In this instance, the state's examples further illustrate
the overlap of the statutes. According to the state, a person may
be in violation of the Computer Crimes statute by accessing a
computer system and "alter [ing] existing information to reflect
that payment had been made on a debt, or one could simply direct
14

a computer by altering existing information to issue checks rv
something else of value Lu cna*" r-

e

alteration examples reflect the execution ^;. a scheme with an
intent :.

aef: =i.;:i i ; means cf misrepresentations made via

computer f - •• '
of

.

• ^.-

• •-—

,is ,uu.,, :,iie wttenses aie indistinguishable.

Because the

Communications Fraud and Computer Crimes statutes share the same
• '.-••

->- - :i n

•

- d w :i t:l i til :t i s

matter under the statute carrying the less severe penalty.
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•

•

-- •

_

.
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i^..J

to

sentence [Kentj : - - :.- lesser penalty prescribed b\ tne other
statutes " ' c
, .„..

u

af l^-l^'

-a*-her

Kent rids reiiea on Bryan. "^9

.^j...... ...;. ...--. ,.v A*...,g proposition: The lorgery,

Insurance Fraud and Communications Fraud sratutes appear to
require proof of mental culpability that is equal to or greater
...-1

.. i

-

'established to prove a violation of the

Computer Crimes statute. Any perceived difference

in the mens

rea

elements does n^4- render Shondel, 453 P. 2d at 146, inapplicable.
m v d L - .L L. ..::.:„ ^nondel and the proposition that Kent is
entitled to have her case prooeed under the statute that carries
the less severe penalty, Shondel,, 453 P. 2a at 14C"

v • £11 :i : 1: :i n

statutes gives accused the benefit of proceeding under the lesser
of the two penalties); Bryan, 709 P.2d at 257 (if defendant acted
with the less culpable mental state, lower offense applies).
Bryan is meant to bolster Kent's Shondel argument.
C.

THE STATE'S "SPECIFIC CONDUCT" ARGUMENT IS UNPERSUASIVE.

In its final point, the state incorrectly asserts that to
the extent Kent's conduct may be punishable under the Forgery,
Insurance Fraud, and Communications Fraud statutes, the state is
entitled to proceed under the Computer Crimes statute because it
proscribes specific conduct, while the remaining statutes
proscribe general conduct.

(S.B. at 22.) In support of its

assertion, the state relies on State v. Clark, 632 P.2d 841 (Utah
1981), which is distinguishable in that context. In addition, the
state unpersuasively argues that penalizing Kent more harshly
serves a "rational basis."
1. State

v. Clark

Is Inapposite.

The state relies on Clark, 632 P.2d at 841, to assert that
the trial court correctly proceeded with this matter under the
Computer Crimes statute. In that case, defendant argued he should
be charged with general theft, rather than theft of livestock,
where he was accused of stealing three turkeys. The general theft
statute did not state specifically that theft of livestock was
punishable.

Id. at 843 n.3. Thus, the Utah Supreme Court applied

the specific over the general. Id.; see also Gomez, 722 P.2d at
74 9-50

(statutes at issue proscribed the same conduct, except

that harsher statute specified that "signing" of a sales slip in
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fraudulent use of a credit card was punishable, where more
lenient s t a t u s made mere use MI
Dure*.

"habit ' , State v .

I IMI |IIIIII

^|»|»

iy89)

'.statutes at issue

proscribed same conduct, except that harsher statute applied when
"any prisoner" committ~

.. -

-i.i

when "any person" committ^ a acL> ; State v. Hales, 652 P.2d

. ;
1290

(Utah 1982) .
Kent's I'MSP
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lic;l i ihrmjlslidl -1

\\\\
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Lenient,

general tnett staler- in Cidrk did not specify theft of livestock
as an offense
str,: ' -

(Clark, 63 2 P.2d at 84? n.^J , the mo^e lenient

i

-

iniiij a r*\ iini.s I i iuu(

' .-•

proscribe use oi a computer
Code Ann, §§

^6-f-LS0:-2M

.:: the commission of the crime

and 76-10 - 1801 (^

-;- 4

. . . v: - .

3ome~ , ^^.L.^..

-,he commission

UQica,. ..::•
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;
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-nrerj oi Liie :cur
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^' the offense.
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"-specific" conduct ct" issue
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In that context,

In this case, Shonae. r^aui-^-

::arge carrying i-ne lesser penalty.
Wit;, respect to the Insurance Fraud statute, while

not explicitly penalize us- ^f a computer,
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-
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r^o

• ir a "spec. : .c"

• • ::a,./.. alleged IJJ Kent's case

violative of tnat sr.atute.
Clark,, since th^ r^vr4wii-.

Utah

In fh.it context,

statutes at. issue proscribe the "specific"
use :)f a computer v

specitically

^

Kent's case is distinguishable from,.

":: d not address the ir inflici

filial, diiises

- -J .-. ... h choosing between, two specific
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statutes. If the prosecutor chooses to focus on the means used to
perpetrate the fraud against an insurance claims system, the
prosecutor will proceed under the Computer Crimes statute, a
second degree felony. If the prosecutor chooses to focus on the
victim, the prosecutor will proceed under the Insurance Fraud
statute, a third degree felony. While the statutes accommodate
prosecution for like conduct, they do not treat members within
the class equally.
Inasmuch as the choice is left to the discretion of the
prosecutor, under Shondel, Loveless, and Bryan, such a choice is
arbitrary and standardless, treating a subclass of defendants
non-uniformly. See also State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 998 (Utah
1995) (leaving the choice to the prosecutor is unreasonable,
arbitrary and standardless under state constitution).

Since both

statutes "specifically" target the conduct alleged in the
Information filed against Kent, the trial court erred in leaving
the prosecutor with the choice to proceed under the statute
carrying the harsher penalty. See Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148;
Loveless, 581 P.2d at 577; Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263.
2. The State's "Reasonable Basis" Argument Is
Insupportable.
The state asserts that so long as legislative distinctions
are not arbitrary, the state may proceed under the statute
carrying the harsher penalty.

(S.B. at 23-24.) The state also

asserts that so long as there is a rational basis for imposing a
more severe penalty on Kent for alleged violations of the
Computer Crimes statute, the state is not required to proceed
18

under one of the fraud-based statutes carrying a lesser penalty.
(Id.)
Claik s """ i dtio'iial distinction" analysis does not apply in
the context or" rh:^ case.

There, the court was concerned with a

genera] citea^^v of crime, and :i ts s 1 :ibcategoi y of speci fi :! :ii :i n i e s
._.. ::iier penalty.
It is no* unconstitutional for a state to impose a more
severe penalty for a particular type of crime than the
penalty which is imposed with respect to the general
category of crimes to which the special crime is related or
of which it: is a subcategory
As long as the legislative classifications are notarbitrary, the fact that conduct may violate both a general
and a specific provision of the criminal laws does not
render the legislation unconstitutional, even though one
violation is subject to a greater sentence.
Clark, 632 P.2d at 843-44. In this case, the Court must decide
;

whether
specific

provisions.

;It

-* • u~ ,

L: :.a\

. lative of

under Shondei, * rr- trial court

erred in failing to proceed under the statute carrying *
pe;".

other

s

^-sser

v.
in Lhe event this Court determines it: is required to engage

in ;:e rational basisydist:neti^n analysis advance
K.e*

-

-

,

. i. tinction L..eLrte^u tiie other

fraud-based statutes and the Computer Crimes statute that would
warrant harsher punishment
!•'."•

. - ?- • - o -a+- •- --i-n ^:.~ .

...:-.:: ! is justified

for the following reason:
Our society has become increasingly dependent en the use of
computers. Computers are used to store important data and to
perform various necessary financial and business functions.
Like theft of livestock, using a computer to FI-M1 r»r

defraud is easy to do and extremely difficult to detect.
Forgery, insurance fraud, and communications fraud, on the
other hand, are, because of the nature of their crimes, more
easily detected. For example, forgery involves writings that
can be examined and verified. The origins of forged
documents can almost always be traced. . . Similarly,
communications fraud requires [an indirect or direct]
communication to someone, thereby providing a means of
identifying the person perpetrating the fraud. In contrast,
a computer crime is essentially a faceless crime. One can
easily access a computer and steal something of value with
no one the wiser and with no way to identify the thief.
(S.B. at 24.)
reasons.

The state's assertion rings hollow for several

First, like the Computer Crimes statute, the plain

language of the Forgery and Communications Fraud statutes
specifically prohibits use of a computer to perpetrate the fraud.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-501(2) and 76-10-1801(6)(b). Yet those
statutes do not contemplate a "harsher penalty" when a computer
is used in the commission of the offense. By proscribing conduct
that is already specifically punishable in the Forgery and
Communications Fraud statutes, the Computer Crimes statute
creates a conflict, and it renders language in the Forgery and
Communications Fraud statutes superfluous. It also undermines the
"purpose" identified by the state for enacting the harsher
penalty in the Computer Crimes statute.
Second, with regard to the Insurance Fraud statute, it
likewise proscribes specific conduct. See Argument A.2., pp. Ills, supra. There is no rational basis for arbitrarily proceeding
with this matter under the Computer Crimes statute, particularly
since it carries the harsher penalty. Where there is a choice,
the state is required to proceed under the statute carrying the
less severe penalty.
20

Third, the state's rationalization for the harsher penalty
is not supportable. The plain language of the Computer Crimes
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-701, et sec^_ (1995 and Supp. 1996),
does not suggest a basis for penalizing a computer crime in the
context of this case more harshly. In the trial court, the
prosecutor argued that the legislative history must be examined
to determine such a basis. (R. 42.) The prosecutor asserted,
"According to the 1985 legislative history behind the Computer
Crimes statute, the Legislature passed the bill to address the
problem of computer hackers accessing computerized systems and
either damaging the data bases or otherwise committing crimes by
means of unauthorized access into such systems. Senate Floor
Debates, 46th Legislature, Jan. 21, 1986, disc 15, counter no.
14."

A copy of the legislative debates relating to enactment of

the Computer Crimes statute is attached hereto as Addendum A
("Addendum A " ) .

The "purpose" articulated by the prosecutor does

not appear there. See Addendum A.
According to the sponsoring representative and senator, the
"Computer Crimes Act" was enacted because several cases were
"reported to the AG's office but [attorneys] weren't able to
prosecute because we didn't have this bill."

Addendum A at 1 and

7-8. The Act was meant to plug a loophole in crime, not to
penalize certain defendants more harshly for the commission of
offenses that already existed.
Although the legislative history suggests the legislature
had a legitimate basis for enacting the Computer Crimes statute,
21

the history is silent with regard to the rationale for handing
out harsher punishments for offenses that already exist. Silence
should give way to proceeding with such matters under existing
statutes.
Fourth, assuming the purpose for enacting the harsher
penalty was to plug loopholes, the statute in the context of this
case fails to advance that purpose. Instead of plugging
loopholes, the statute more harshly penalizes conduct that is
already made criminal by Utah statute.

The harsher penalty for

existing crimes is not related to plugging loopholes. Currier v.
Holden, 862 P.2d 1357, 1367 (Utah App. 1993) (statute did not
substantially advance the legislative purpose, and adversely
impacted actions unrelated to the problems described by the
legislature, compelling an order striking it as
unconstitutional).
Proceeding under the Computer Crimes Act in this case is
like charging Kent with, e.g., Communications Fraud and
arbitrarily enhancing the penalty. The statute was not meant to
serve as an arbitrary enhancement for existing offenses. The law
does not support that Kent should be subjected to a greater
penalty for allegedly violating the Communications Fraud statute.
Under Utah law, a prosecutor is not entitled to the choice
of charging under one of two specific statutes, where one statute
carries a harsher penalty.

The defendant is entitled to have the

case proceed under the charge for the less severe penalty.
Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148.
22

3.

The State Mischaracterizes the "Factual Record."

Finally, the state argues the "factual record in this case"
supports proceeding with this matter under the Computer Crimes
statute. (S.B. at 25-28.) In point of fact, there is no "factual
record" in this case. The parties proceeded with this appeal in
accordance with State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988) . The
trial court took no evidence and did not conduct a trial.
Notwithstanding the posture of this appeal, the state
repeatedly asserts the record "clearly reflects" that Kent "used
a computer" or "accessed her employer's computer," or otherwise
engaged in computer functions.

More accurately, the Information

in this case alleges that "On March 17, 1995, FBI Special Agent
W. Stephen Whittle received information from Leslie Warner of the
that

First Health security department, in Salt Lake City, Utah,
possible

comvuterized

system . . . ."

fraud

had occurred in their insurance claim

(R. 2-3 (emphasis added).) In addition, for

purposes of the Sery plea, Kent admitted to using her position
with First Health to enter the computer system for filing medical
insurance claims. (R. 47-48.)
The state asserts that based on the allegations, it is
unclear if or how Kent allegedly "altered forms" in the
commission of the fraud.

(S.B. at 26.)

According to the state,

because the Information is void of such allegations, the conduct
cannot be charged as a forgery.

"[W]e do not know whether [the]

alteration resulted in a form that purported to be that of
another or to be executed at a different time or place."
23

(S.B.

at 26.)

The state's assertion is irrational.

The Information

reflects that misrepresentations/alterations concerning claims
purporting to belong to another were executed inducing the
employer's insurance system to issue checks. The elements for
forgery are implicitly as well as explicitly alleged in the
Information.
The state's argument that "the record facts of this case do
not meet the elements of insurance fraud" is also misleading.
The state asserts "nothing in the record of this case indicates
that defendant made a false representation when she directed the
computer to issue the two checks."

(S.B. at 27. ) 5 If that is

the case, Kent should not have been charged with violating the
Computer Crimes statute, since an element of that offense is that
defendant engaged in the conduct using "false pretenses, promises, or representations." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-703(3). Again,
whether Kent is charged with making "false pretenses, promises or
representations" under the Computer Crimes statute, or false
representations under the Insurance Fraud statute, for purposes
of this case the elements are indistinguishable.
With regard to the Communications Fraud statute, the state
claims, "nothing in this record indicates that defendant
actually, either directly or indirectly, communicated, i.e. . • .

5

According to Kent's plea agreement, she did not "direct the
computer to issue the two checks." (S.B. at 27.) Rather, she filed
medical claims purporting to belong to "Cathleen Gullett" resulting
in the issuance of checks. (See R. 47-48; S.B. at 27 n.5.)
24

'with any person' as required by the communications fraud
statute."

(S.B. at 28.)

Yet the Information alleges that Kent

made false representations concerning claims reflecting
entitlement to payment, and that such representations were
communicated via computer -- according to the state, in order to
conceal the crime.

(S.B. at 24.) The Information supports

bringing the action under the Forgery statute, the Communications
Fraud statute or the Insurance Fraud statute. Any other
interpretation is unreasonable.
CONCLUSION
Kent hereby respectfully requests that this Court reverse
the judgment of the trial court.

Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

1986 HOUSE DEBATE
Reading Clerk:

Senate Bill 15, Computer Crimes Act, by
Richard J. Carling. Be it enacted by the
Legislature of the State of Utah.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Carling?

Rep. Carling:

Yes. Representatives, this Senate Bill 15,
as you recall, was before us last session and
was defeated here in this body because of
problems that we found in the bill. Uh, in
the interim, we spent quite a bit of time...
I spent most of the summer with Rob Parrish
of the Attorney General's office and, uh,
clarifying the language, cleaning the bill
up.
This bill has gone before the interim
Judiciary Committee, passed unanimously out
of that committee. Came before the Judiciary
Standing Committee of this sessions, passed
unanimously out of that committee.
Uh, basically the bill, uh, provided criminal
penalties for people who, without
authorization, uh, use computers to defraud
individuals and people. And it also provides
on the last page that any person who has
reason to believe that somebody's violated
the provisions of this act are under
obligation to report that. Uh, we took
out...some of the things we took out were,
uh, things like copying diskettes. We felt
that since it's already covered by federal
copyright laws that that wouldn't be
necessary in our state law to put in this
bill since it's already covered by federal
statutes.
There's a great need for this bill. We've
had several cases reported to the AG's office
but weren't able to prosecute because we
didn't have this bill. So, if there are any
questions, I'll entertain those questions and
encourage your vote for the bill.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Moody?

Rep. Moody:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I rise for the
purpose of amendment. On page 5, delete
lines 1 through 4. If I get a second, I'd
like to speak to that, Mr. Speaker.

Mr. Speaker:

Do you have a second?

Rep. Moody:

Representatives, uh, we did not have this
come out of the committee unanimous. I wanna
make that clear. Uh, I think the bill is a
good bill and support the bill. But I think
this last clause goes too far. I think we
need to understand right now when there's a
crime committed, a person has the
responsibility to report that crime. But
this goes far beyond that.
This states that every person who has reason
to believe. Now, I would assume that may
mean by rumor, that may mean a lot of things.
That may also mean that if a person who is a
perpetrator, a criminal, goes to his attorney
and says, I would like to talk to you, I'm in
real trouble, what do you suggest I do? That
attorney then has the obligation to call up
the Attorney General's office and report. It
also means if that person goes to his priest
and report that he has committed an act that
shouldn't have been committed, that priest
has that responsibility to report. I only
know of one other area in all of the statutes
that we require this and that is under child
abuse law. And I submit to you that where
the statute already covers when a crime is
committed, that we're aware, that we report.
This is unnecessary. It goes too far. I
would ask for your support.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative

Rep.

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I speak against the
amendment. Do you have any sound? I speak
against the amendment for a couple of very
good reasons. The computer industry is a
closed shop. The only people who know if in
fact a theft by deception in computer fraud
has been committed are those within the
industry. And this last piece of language is
really intended for those who would commit an
omission basically, and this is a good bill
with this in it.
2

to this amendment?

I would ask you to defeat the amendment and
I'd also like to point out a couple of horror
stories, if I may. In 1980, the CIA
announced to the rest of the world and the
other intelligence organizations that they
had an impenetrable security system on their
computer. The next day, the Department of
Naval Intelligence sent them a copy of all of
the Western hemisphere agents and they did it
by telephone and interceded their computer.
The other thing I'd like to relay to you is
that in 1979 in Boston, Massachusetts,
Hanover Bank and Trust was raided by
electronic theft of $10 million bucks that
they've never recovered. So this is a
problem, it's a great problem, it's getting
bigger. And only the people in the business
know about how it's carried out. And if you
don't put the language in here requiring
reporting, because it is a closed community,
too many of them will practice that sin of
omission. I think it's a good bill as it is.
I urge you, defeat the amendment and pass the
bill.
Mr. Speaker:

Thank you.

Representative Free?

Rep. Free:

Thank you. I rise in support of that
amendment. I think it gets to be a sad thing
when we start trying to make a shadow society
to check up on everybody here. That would be
typical in Russia but not in America.
And I also call your attention to the fact
that kids 12 years old are getting so
computer competent that they can get into
these things and we don't want, uh, we won't
want to start, uh, eavesdropping on children.

Mr. Speaker:

Thank you.

Representative Cromar?

Rep. Cromar:

Yes. Uh, I'd have to resist the amendment.
This amendment was proposed in committee, and
I think Craig Moody was the only one that
voted for his amendment. Uh, Rob Parrish of
the AG's office said this [inaudible] needed.
Also, Rep. Moss pointed out to me that the
clergy, lawyer-client relationship's already
covered under the law and would apply here.
This doesn't exempt that provision as a law.
3

Uh, also, this is...I understand this is in
our telecommunications product as well. Now
what would happen if we didn't have this
provision? The company would take care of
its dirty wash internally. Several people
may have been defrauded and we wouldn't be
able to prosecute. Now the AG's office feels
this is very important. They said this
before our committee and, like I said, this
amendment was already defeated in committee.
So I urge you to resist the amendment and
vote for the bill.
Mr. Speaker:

Rep. Moody, we'll turn to you to sum up.

Rep. Moody:

Representatives, the issue here is we've
already got a statute that requires you to
report a crime. Nobody has disputed that.
That is currently status quo. The question
here is do we include areas right now that
are not included?
And for Rep. Cromar's comments, that, uh,
they're exempted, is not true. We had a bill
that was passed here three years ago that
there's a Senate bill coming across right now
that included the word "everyone." The
Attorney General's office included that to
mean attorneys, priests, and across the
board. And so, I guess, that means if a wife
suspects her husband, then she too has to
report him. If that's the way we wanna take,
and begin that type of a stand on each law,
then maybe we oughta take that approach.
But I submit to you there are times when it's
important to give somebody a right to be able
to go to somebody and get counsel and advise
without having that person turn them in to
the Attorney General. And I think it's a bad
precedent to be setting by voting and leaving
this bill...this in the bill and I would ask
for your support to take it out. Thank you.

Mr. Speaker:

The motion is that we bracket all of the
wording in 76-6-705, that's all of the, uh,
material on, uh, 5. It's on the screen. All
those in favor of demotion, say "aye." All
those opposed? Chair rules that the ayes
have it.
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[Inaudible] has been called for. If ten
representatives will stand. Five
representatives will stand. We'll be in
a...voting is now open on the bill, or on the
motion.
[Inaudible] on uh, the motion?
There are 43 "yes" votes, 10 "no" votes. The
motion passes. To the bill. How do I tell
who's who now? I don't see any other lights
to the bill. Rep. Cromar, we'll move to you
for sum up.
Rep. Cromar:

Uh, yes. Uh, I wish Rob Parrish were here
from the AG's office. I think the vote we
just took was a mistake based on messages
I've had from them. Whether the Senate
concurs on this amendment has yet to be seen.
But I urge you to still support the bill.
We'll have to go back to the Senate and see
if they'll concur with this amendment.

Mr. Speaker:

Are we ready to vote? Just...just a moment
while the, uh, board clears and we'll...
voting is now open on Senate Bill 15 as
amendment.
Voting is closed on Senate Bill 15 as
amended. Senate Bill 15 as amended, having
received 62 "yes" votes and no negative
votes, passes this House and will be returned
to the Senate for its further action.
Representative Olsen?
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1986 SENATE DEBATE
Secretary:

Bill 15, Computer Crimes Act, by Senator
Richard J. Carling. The [inaudible],
Mr. President, judiciary to which was
referred Senate Bill 15, Computer Crimes Act,
by Senator Carling and others have
[inaudible] consider this bill [inaudible] to
that committee with the following amendment,
page 4, line 13 after "[inaudible]
investigate and....11 Page 4, lines 11 and
12, after "general [inaudible]." With the
assistance of the any and insured or the
[inaudible] committee chairman.

Mr. President:

Senator Carling?

Sen. Carling:

I move we adopt the committee report,

Mr. President

Those in favor, say "aye".
[Inaudible] have it again.

Sen. Carling:

Mr. President, this was a bill that we
discussed and passed unanimously last year.
This is merely a bill [inaudible] between the
current theft law and the computer law.

Opposed, "no".
Senator Carling?

Because of the advance in technology, our
theft law does not go far enough to, uh,
protect against computer crimes. The bill
comes from the Utah Attorney General's
office, from the Credit Bureau, and other
people who have problems in securing in the
computer system.
The primary change in the bill this year that
was defeated in the House, uh, last year is
that we've taken out the provisions that
would, uh, give the people who innocently,
uh, copying the computer programs and those
type of things, such as the kids and, uh,
looking mainly at computer crimes. The
Attorney General's office has indicated that
they're unable to prosecute computer crimes
under the current law. And, in fact,
indicated in a letter to me that since last
year, they've had a case which should've been
prosecuted but could not be prosecuted
because of the problem with the 1979 law.
This is merely to close those loopholes.
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Mr. President:

Senator Overson?

Sen. Overson:

Yes. Urn, Senator Carling, I have to have a
question here. About the language on
line 11, page 3, where it says "discloses."
Now, as I read this, a person who, without
authorization, gains or attempts to gain
access and intentionally discloses... now I'm
reading in the context...and to the damage of
another, is that included as a person who,
without authorization, gains or attempts to
gain access and intentionally, to the damage
of others, discloses, modifies or such, that
would be [inaudible--both speaking at once]?

Sen. Carling:

Yeah, but it's modified by, uh, intentionally
and to the damage of another. That would be
if somebody comes in and [inaudible] a credit
bureau record and tries to sell it to someone
else.

Sen. Overson:

Okay. How about, uh, somebody who sits down
at the computer terminal and, uh, he types up
the code. He works there and the...his good
buddy sitting next to him and, uh, discloses
to him the computer program. And that guy
subsequently uses the information he receives
from there. Who's...who's gonna be in
violation?

Sen. Carling:

I imagine the person who intentionally and to
the damage of the other. Now the other's
gotta be damages shown. And to the damage of
the other. If a person's doing it as a
hobby, this type of thing, uh, I doubt that
there'd be a problem. But if the way they do
it, for the purpose of intentionally damaging
another.

Sen. Overson:

So, I guess, the...they'd have to prove
intention and damage rather than the fact
that they just merely disclosed?

Sen. Carling:

Right.

Sen. Overson:

Okay. The criminal intent?

Sen.

Senator Carling, on page 2, line 13, where
you deleted the word "property" and put
"computer property" in there. We're dealing
with a bill or an act that relates to
offenses against property, too. Should that

It has to be [inaudible].
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definition really be changed in this
[inaudible]?
[Inaudible].
Sen. Carling:

The Attorney General's office are the ones
that put these in here and I believe this
goes to Utah Computer Crimes Act. This is
not just the property. If you'll take a look
at page 1, uh, lines 25 and 26. This is the
[inaudible] was this act shall be known as
the Utah Computer, uh, Utah Computer Fraud
Crimes Act. This goes to computers. And so
this is merely indicating that the Computer
Fraud Act goes to computer property, not just
general property.

Sen.

[Inaudible]. Now there may be other
properties involved and it seems to me that
the definition still should remain property
rather than computer property alone.

Sen. Carling:

That was [inaudible] made by the Attorney
General's office felt that it should say
computer property. It's 'cause we're not
dealing with just general property. We're
just dealing with computers.

Sen.

[Inaudible].

Sen. Carling:

I'd be happy, Senator
, to check
with Mr. Parrish and [inaudible] between
second and third reading.

[Inaudible conversation]
Mr. President

Any questions?
Question on the bill.

Mr. President:

Questions been called for and the question
is, shall Senate Bill 15 pass?

Secretary:

[Inaudible].

Mr. President

[Inaudible] question is, shall Senate Bill 15
be read for the third time?

Secretary:

[Reading of names]

Mr. President:

Senate Bill 15 shows 24 "ayes", no "nays", 5
being absent. Bill passes and will be placed
on the third reading calendar.
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